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In the September issue of the American Journal of Bioethics, Kious and Battin (1) present their
arguments on why physician aid-in-dying (PAD) due to severe suffering should also be allowed in
non-terminal psychiatric diseases. The authors argue that a crucial aspect of PAD is the assessment
of the decision-making capacity. Furthermore, they elaborate on the incompatibility of current PAD
regulations and compulsory treatment because of suicidality, emphasizing differences between
European, Canadian, and US-American policies. They differentiate between possible pathways the
discussion about laws and policies concerning medically assisted dying could lead to. Firstly, keep
the status quo, requiring a terminal illness, without considering the suffering caused by mental
illness. Secondly, a change toward a partial opening of PAD for people with mental illness if their
decision-making capacity is intact. This approach would require a change in policies regarding
assisted dying while at the same time changing the involuntary civil commitment practices. The
third approach devises a metric to measure suffering. While allowing patients who reach the
threshold of unbearable suffering to access PAD, people with lower scores of suffering would fall
under the policies of involuntary civil commitment and treatment. This third approach poses
difﬁcult questions concerning the nature of an instrument to determine suffering, the deﬁnition of
suffering and its thresholds, and about the authority of the gatekeeper determining whether a person
qualiﬁes for PAD.
We congratulate the authors for their balanced and differentiated argumentation on a highly
important and still critically discussed topic in psychiatry. The line of thought they present focuses on the
situation in the United States of America and resembles the current discussion in Switzerland. The
history of PAD in Switzerland dates back to the early 1980s and has since then been part of the public
and psychiatric discourse (2). The criteria include a terminal illness after all treatment options have
failed, a fact which has to be conﬁrmed by a third party. In 2018, the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences
(SAMW) updated their recommendation, replacing the requirement of terminality by the criteria of
unbearable suffering. This change of policy would, among others, allow people suffering from mental
illness to access PAD (3). The Swiss Medical Association (FMH), however, decided not to adopt this
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recommendation—a ﬁrst in the history of the FMH—and to restrict
PAD to cases of terminal illness (4). This dispute reﬂects the change
from the ﬁrst to the second approach discussed by Kious and Battin.
We share the opinion that persons suffering from a
psychiatric illness should not automatically be excluded from
PAD despite having the capacity to decide in this issue. This can
be seen as one of the many instances of structural stigmatization
this person group has to endure (5), and it is incompatible with
the current motion of empowerment in psychiatry (6). However,
the unﬁnished discourse about the deﬁnition and importance of
being terminally ill—as it is currently discussed in Switzerland—
seems to be a highly relevant aspect that is insufﬁciently
discussed by Kious and Battin. They correctly refute the ideas
that terminality is required to minimize the amount of life lost,
and that causing the death of someone who is terminally ill is not
really killing. Correctly, they conclude that terminality is
required as a safeguard. Then—prematurely and without the
necessary critical discussion, in our view—they dismiss this point
as “question-begging” when balancing the prevention of a
slippery slope and the exclusion of a whole group of severely
suffering individuals from PAD. The difﬁculty of this decision is
also based on the partially opposing and overlapping theories of
suicidality, unbearable suffering, terminality, and irreversibility.
The authors do not discuss PAD within the concept of
suicidality. It seems crucial to distinguish the symptom
suicidality as part of a psychiatric syndrome or disorder in
contrast to the wish to die based on unbearable suffering
caused by mental illness. To date, terminality has served as a
potential safeguard: 1) to ensure the irreversibility and 2) to
warrant stability regarding the decision for PAD. The ﬁrst point
assumes that irreversibility can be used synonymously with
terminality. However, in the case of mental illness,
irreversibility of unbearable suffering might be deﬁned by the
lack of therapeutic interventions potentially relieving the
symptoms, while not qualifying as a terminal illness. The
second argument highlights the contrast, as we know that a
considerable percentage of persons who choose to commit
suicide regret this decision later on (7). It is even quite
common that persons having decided to commit suicide
abandon this plan during the act of suicide. This does not
necessarily mean that the person has not really made up their
mind before acting, that he or she did not really want to die, or
that the suicidal act is discontinued because of pain that would
not be the case in PAD. It can also be an expression of genuine
“second thoughts,” of a change of perspective when directly
confronted with the consequence of death. Complicating this
issue even more, coming to terms with an irreversibly poor
health condition despite unchanging situation and suffering is
one of the therapeutic responsibilities in mental health care.
Current psychiatry aims to reach recovery even in chronically ill
patients (8), and pursuing recovery in chronic suffering due to
psychiatric disease may mean that a person can change from
embracing PAD to embracing living with their suffering.
Hence, we propose that before starting a dialogue on potential
policy and legal changes regarding PAD and involuntary
commitment, the discussion should focus on the conditions
under which a severe mental illness might lead to such a
pronounced and unbearable state of suffering, with no prospect
of therapeutic improvement. Rather than ﬁnding measures of
suffering and deﬁning thresholds, it is important to look at the
complexity of human existence while suffering from a mental
disorder. Life constellations of people searching the path of PAD
need to be assessed, taking into consideration irreversibility in
the context of biological, psychological, social, and spiritual
characteristics. It is crucial to empower patients, peer workers,
and relatives of people with mental illness to participate in this
discourse. Only a participative approach will help us ﬁnd
solutions that bridge the gap between the needs of people with
mental illness and society as a whole.
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